Psych-Predicates: How They Are Different by Lee Chungmin
Copyright 2012 by Chungmin Lee
26th Pacific Asia Conference on Language,Information and Computation pages 626–631
Psych-Predicates: How They Are Different 
Chungmin Lee
Seoul Nat’l U
1 Gwanak-ro,        
Seoul 151-742,
Korea
clee@snu.ac.kr
Abstract
This paper is concerned with 
characterizing psych-predicates in Korean 
and possibly in Japanese in the GL spirit. 
We focus on the the status of the 
Experiencer (or ‘judge’) in relation to 
other arguments and examine the first-
person subjectivity data (constraint). The 
relevant cause and effect relation and 
consequent coerced event function is 
postulated for coherent interpretation.  
Keywords: psych-predicates, experiencer, 
first-person (subjectivity) data, causation.
1 Introduction
We will characterize psych-predicates =
experiencer-predicates and predicates of 
personal taste in Korean, focusing on the 
status of the Experiencer in relation to
arguments and examining the first-person 
subjectivity data (constraint). The relevant 
cause and effect relation and consequent 
coerced event function is postulated for 
coherent interpretation.  2 will show data and 
raise issues; 3 will discuss issues in the GL 
spirit; and 4 will conclude the discussion. 
2 Data and Issues
Consider (1) (Lee 2010), where description of 
psych state in the present tense by the first-
person but not by the third or second person is 
acceptable. Here the ‘judge’ is the speaker. This 
first-person subjectivity constraint is observed in 
Korean and Japanese.
(1)  na/?*ku/?*ne -nun ecirep-ta 
I/he/you    -TOP dizzy-DEC 
‘I am/?*he is/?*you are dizzy.’
(2) watashi-wa/?*kare-wa/?*anata-wa sabishi 
?lonely? desu
‘I am/?*he is/?*you are lonely.’
However, even in the present, if the psych-
adjective takes a verbalizer –e hay ‘show signs 
of being psych-Adj,’ a third-person with it 
becomes quite acceptable, as in (2).
(3) ku-ka    ecirep –e hay
he -NOM    dizzy-E do 
‘He shows signs of being dizzy.’ 
Because the speaker sees his act of, say, turning 
in circles as evidence to utter (2), Tenny (2006) 
calls the Japanese counterpart –garu an 
evidential, which also lifts the person restriction 
as in Korean. In English, ‘He is dizzy’ may be 
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uttered on the basis of the speaker’s seeing him 
turn in circles or hearing from him or someone 
else1 and is not distinct from ‘I am dizzy.’ The 
past form of (1) is fine with the 3rd-person 
subject (Ku-nun ecirew-ess-ta ‘He was dizzy’); it 
may be assumed that there could have been 
conveyance of information from him to the
speaker). With a modal (conjecture) or future 
marker attached to the psych-adjective, the 1st-
person constraint is waived. Korean has a clearer 
reportative evidential, as in (4), which also lifts 
the first-person restriction. 
(4) ku-ka  ecirep -tay [-tay: reportative]
he-NOM dizzy-REPORT -DEC 
‘He says he is dizzy’ or 
‘He is said to be dizzy.’      
On the other hand, in an interrogative sentence 
in the present tense, the second person subject, 
not the first person subject, is acceptable, asking 
the hearer = the speaker-to-be about her/his 
psychological state. The perspective is shifted  
from the current speaker to the next speaker, who 
is the hearer, who will answer the question. At 
the point of answering the question, the person 
who answers or speaks is the one who is entitled 
to know her/his own internal psychological state.   
(5) ne ecirewu-nya? 
you dizzy  -Q
‘Are you dizzy?’
The cause of spins may be from drinking on an 
empty stomach. But utterances can appear 
without expressing causes and such psych-
Adjectives as ‘dizzy,’ ‘lonely’ may form a 
sentence with just an Experiencer. In a cause 
adjunct clause, the Agent is typically co-
referential with the 1st-person Experiencer in the 
main clause psych-predicate. The drinker and the
one who feels dizzy must be the same person, in 
accordance with argument coherence in causation 
structure in GL (Pustejovsky 1995). 
Then, let us observe the following type, which 
some authors call ‘predicates of personal taste’
(Lasersohn, 2005;?Stephenson, 2007).
1 We can posit some abstract hidden evidentiality of learning 
about or simulating the psych state of the third-person 
statement.
(6) The roller coaster is fun (for me).
(7) a. This walnut is tasty (for me/for him).
b. Walnuts are tasty.    
I drank on an
They require the Stimulus subject/Topic unlike (1). 
Instead, the 1st-person Experiencer or evaluator is an 
optional adjunct.
Lasersohn (2005) makes use of Kaplan’s 
(1978) distinction between character and content,
and between context of utterance and index of 
evaluation. Lasersohn adds a judge to the index of 
evaluation, which becomes a triple <w,t,j> of
world, time, and judge.
(8) [[fun]]c; w,t,j = [?xe. x is fun for j in w at t]
(9) [[tasty]]c; w,t,j = [[taste good]] c; w,t,j =[?xe . x 
tastes good to j in w at t]
(10) [[This cake is tasty]] c; w,t,j = 1 iff this cake 
is tasty to j in w at t.
However, j can shift from me the speaker to him a
non-speaker, depending on a judge salient in the 
context in English. In Korean, the 1st-person 
constraint must be kept (such that j=I, if t=n
(‘now’/speech time) and the formalism must be 
adjusted conditionally accordingly. The 1st-person 
orientation is generally accepted. The shifting 
from it to attitude holder (in attitude report 
sentences such as, Mary thinks this cake is tasty)
One clear distinction between the type of (1) 
and that of predicates of personal taste is that the 
latter can have a generic statement such as (7b) 
but not the type of (1). See the contrast: (10a) vs. 
(10b).
(10) a. ???hankwukin-un ecirep-ta 
Koreans –TOP dizzy
‘Koreans are dizzy.’
b. hankwukin-un hwal-ul cal sso-n-ta 
‘Koreans are excellent archers.’
Furthermore, for predicates of personal taste, the 
following faultless/subjective disagreement is
agreed on:
(10) a. John: This cake is tasty.
b. Mary: No, it’s not tasty.
Here both speakers have said something true, so 
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long as each was sincere. Thus the disagreement 
does not seem to be one that can be resolved.
But for Experiencer-present psych-predicates,
as in (1), the same disagreement is not warranted, 
as in (11). Other than the speaker is not entitled to 
disagree on the 1st-person speaker’s expressed 
psychological state (therefore, 11b). (11c) is not 
relevant in the context.
(11) a. John: I am dizzy. (angry, lonely, sad)
b. Mary: ??No, you are not dizzy.
c. Mary: ??No, I am not dizzy.
There are debates between relativists and
contextualists. In work on context-dependence,
some authors have argued that certain types of 
sentences such as those of personal taste and 
epistemic modality give rise to a notion of 
relative truth: truth relative not only to a world 
and time of evaluation, but also to something 
like a “context of evaluation” (Egan et al. 2004), 
“context of assessment” (MacFarlane, 2005) or 
a “judge” (Lasersohn 2005).
An alternative contextualist approach argues
that the context-dependence enters in passing
from “character” in the sense of Kaplan (1989) 
to the actual proposition expressed (“content”): 
what proposition is expressed may vary from 
context to context, but once the proposition is 
fixed, its truth-conditions are not “relative”, and 
no extra parameters need to be added to indices 
of evaluation (Stanley 2007). Positing implicit 
content, this commonly employed linguistic 
strategy leads to contextualism, e.g. for 
Kratzer’s appeal to implicit “in view of” 
clauses providing the implicit domains of 
various modals. The posited implicit content 
becomes part of the proposition expressed (or
of the semantic content). This is relevant for
propositional attitude ascriptions and for 
sentential anaphora, etc. (Partee 2009).
Regarding (11a), Stojanovic (2011) inherits 
some aspect of the Kaplanian view (1989) with 
the following sequence (modified):
(12) a. Mary (pointing at John): He is dizzy.
b. Jane: That’s what he said, too. 
Based on the ‘same-saying’ between (11a) and 
(12a) and the truth of the related report in (12b), 
she proposes that the content of (11a) is a 
function that takes an individual (with a world, a 
time and other things) and returns value True iff 
the individual is dizzy (in that world and at that 
time). John is asserting this content of himself. 
The content associated with (12a) is the very 
same function, and Mary is asserting this content 
about John. The contents are the same and the 
function corresponds to the property of being 
dizzy. By having an operator that binds the 
variable for the 1-st-person oriented interpretation 
of the sentence, the property claim makes it 
‘judge-free’ (Pearson, forthcoming). However, 
there is a language-specific constraint that blocks 
the shift from (11a) (‘I’ expression) to (12a) (‘he’
expression) in the present tense, namely, in 
Korean and Japanese. “He was dizzy” in the past is 
acceptable. This constraint must be represented.  
Psych predicates involve direct 
sensory/perceptual experience by the 1st-person at 
the core and the direct sensory/perceptual 
evidential marker –te in Korean, which Japanese 
lacks, also involves the 1st-person at the core and 
they occur, as in (13). The evidential marker –te 
implicates that the current speaker has direct 
sensory/perceptual evidence, acquired before 
speech time by default, regarding its prejacent 
argument proposition ? of type < s, t >. ??itself 
is a psych predicate. In (13), therefore, the 
Experiencer, the 1st-person, which can appear as 
Topic at S-initial position, coincides with the 
evidence holder, the 1st-person again, not 
realizable on the surface.   
(13) a. Ku namwu-ka po-i-te-ra [visual]
the tree-NOM see-PASS-
‘The tree was visible to me.’
b. Kangtang-i shikkurep-te-ra [hearing] 
auditorium-NOM noisy- TE-DEC
‘[I heard] the auditorium was noisy.’
c. Pipimpap-i mas-iss-te-ra [taste]
pipimpap-NOM tasty -TE-DEC
‘[I tasted] the pipimpap was tasty.’
d. Kkoch-i hyangkirop - te-ra [smell]  
flower-NOM fragrant TE-DEC
‘[I smelled] the flower was fragrant.’
e. Son-i pwuterep-te-ra [touch]
hand-NOM  soft -TE-DEC
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‘[I touched] the hand was soft.’
f. Ttang-i pal-ey tah-te-ra [touch]
earth –NOM foot-at reach-TE-DEC
‘[I felt] my foot touched the earth.’ (in 
water)
g. Kapang-i mwukep- te-ra     [weight]
bag  -NOM heavy- TE-DEC
‘[I weighed] the bag was heavy.’
h. (Na-nun) sulphu-te-ra           [feeling] 
I-TOP  sad  -TE-DEC
‘[I felt] I was sad.’
The science of consciousness must be based on 
the 1st person data vs. the 3rd person data involved 
in this asymmetry (Chalmers 2010, 1995), with 
the third-person data about behavior and brain 
processes, and first-person data about “subjective 
experience.” Chalmers lists first-person data as 
follows: 
???
(14) a. visual experience (e.g. that of color and 
depth) 
???????b. other perceptual experiences (e.g. 
auditory and tactile experience) 
???????c. bodily experiences (e.g. pain and hunger) 
???????d. mental imagery (e.g. recalled visual 
images) 
???????e. emotional experience (e.g. happiness and 
anger) 
??????f. occurrent thought (e.g. the experience of 
reflecting and deciding) 
However, we have one finer distinction between 
outer-directed and inner-directed in evidentials 
and psych-predicates in Korean, which we need, 
even though they may be considered in the same 
wider subjective experience category. My 
volitional act, unlike psych predicates, cannot 
occur with the direct evidential maker –te. A
psych sentence cannot take a non-1st-person 
subject if it co-occurs with the evidential maker   
–te. With –te, introspection is possible, as in (13), 
but outer-directed direct observation is odd, as in 
(15). A volitional act (15) with –te shows exact 
asymmetry in possible subject persons.
(15) ???Nay-ka pap-ul mek-te-ra  
I-NOM rice-ACC eat-TE-DEC
‘[I observed] I was eating rice.’
On the other hand, there occurs a very interesting 
contrast between (16a) and (16b). By the direct 
evidential marker –te (16a) asserts at-issue that 
‘he was dizzy’ and implicates that I, the speaker, 
acquired the evidence by observing it directly at 
that time, which after all turn out to be odd. 
Rather, the past tense marking of the same psych 
proposition at-issue is felicitous in (16b).  
Because of the past tense, there could have been a 
time interval in which the speaker could learn 
about ‘his being dizzy’ or hear/see his 
saying/showing signs of or simulate ‘I am dizzy.’
(16) a. ?*Ku-nun ecirep-te-ra
he-TOP dizzy-TE-DEC 
‘[I directly perceived] he was dizzy.’
b. Ku-nun ecirep-ess-ta
he-TOP dizzy-PAST-DEC
‘He was dizzy.’
3. GL Concerns: Causation 
Now in the GL concerns, the overall causation
structure matters (based on Aristotelian qualia) 
and a coherent causal relation between the 
causing event (with the AGENTIVE quale) and the
resulting event is considered even for psych
(experiencer) predicates.
Psych predicates with a Stimulus subject or 
predicates of personal taste, as in (13), typically 
involve a metonymic reconstruction of the subject 
to an event (function) via agentive quale in GL. 
(Mary’s watching) the movie frightened her, (My 
seeing) Bill’s face scared me, and (My reading)
the book bored me, are examples of coerced 
activity involving perception/cognition in a 
transitive causative sentence in English. However, 
inanimate subjects in a transitive causative 
sentence are not fully acceptable in Korean. 
Instead, Experiencer Topic + Stimulus 
Nominative + Psych predicate is typical (with the 
Topic alternating with a Dative+Top). Observe 
(14). If the Experiencer Topic is extra-ordinarily 
focused, it also gets a Nominative, forming a so-
called a double Nominative construction.  
(13) The movie frightened
(14) na-nun horangi-ka 
Mary.
mwusep
I-TOP tiger  -NOM fear
-ta 
‘I fear a tiger.’
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In GL (Pustejovsky 1995), angry is as follows in its 
qualia specification:
                    FORMAL = angry (e1, <1>)
QUALIA =   AGENTIVE = psych_act ((e2 , <1>, <2>)
1. TABLE: Attribute-Value Matrix for angry 
Unlike in direct causation, as in kill, the 
Experiencer’s psych state event e1 is headed 
instead of its causative/imchoative process e2,
where the default second argument is not 
prominent. Even in the specification of the 
transitive causative verb anger, only the 
Experiencer argument is prominently represented 
regardless of the surface realization of the causing 
sub-event.
In Korean and English, there can be different
classes of psych predicates in combination with 
cause event: one class such as mianha-ta ‘sorry’
that are used with a causal event of the 
Experiencer’s own act not favorable to the other 
party. The English sorry can also be used to show 
the Experiencer’s sympathy with the other party 
for her/his unfavorable event. A psych predicate 
komap-ta ‘thankful/grateful’ is used for the other 
or third party’s act as agent, but not for the 
Experiencer’s own act, in the preceding causal 
event. These are used as semi-performatives
when uttered to the addressee in the present tence.
Many psych predicates such as boring, scaring, 
frightening, surprising, pleasing, amusing, 
fascinating, and fun, and their Korean equivalents 
are used with the Experiencer’s own perceptual or 
cognitive causal event. (See Nam (2009) for two 
classes in Korean.)
Because of the event function coming from the 
agentive quale of the nominal in the subject 
position in English and the post-Topic position in 
Korean, it is well explained why psych predicates, 
predominantly or underlyingly adjectival, are 
basically not an individual-level predicate such as 
intelligent and tall but a stage-level predicate, as 
exemplified in GL. Some of them are somewhat 
lasting, not just instantaneous, in their aroused 
psychological state but they may be different 
from real individual-level predicates. Pearson’s
forthcoming, however, argues that predicates of 
personal taste are individual-level predicates, 
showing *There were cakes tasty, *There were 
games fun in parallel with There were people tall,
and associating them with genericity (the 
genericity claim coincides with Lee’s 2011 claim).
Other approaches in semantics and philosophy of 
language rarely touch on this event function 
possibility and a semantically default (logically 
implicated but not realized) causative/inchoative 
process event for psych predicates. 
4. Concluding Remarks
The 1st-person (present) constraint for psych 
predicates in Korean and Japanese is the core and 
starting point of subjectivity. The science of 
cognition and consciousness must seek clues of 
evidentiality of learning (and or simulation) in the 
possible expression of ‘Mary is dizzy’ vs. the 
impossible expression of ?*‘Mary is dizzy’ in 
Korean and Japanese. Otherwise, we cannot
secure the objective state of ‘Mary is dizzy’ even 
if we have her brain opened up and take a look at 
the associated physical states.  
The GL principle of argument coherence in the 
overall psych causation structure and qualia are 
suggestive but their descriptive contents must be 
further specified to be further actively applied.
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